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Background paper  
 
Peacebuilding: A broad review of 
approaches, policies and practices 
Dr. Nicolas Lemay-Hébert and Sophie Toupin 
Introduction 
The term peacebuilding was first introduced through UN Secretary-
General Boutros Boutros-Ghali‟s report to the Security Council, 
Agenda for Peace, in 1992. Since then, peacebuilding has been 
included in the policies of donors, multilateral and regional 
organizations. Emergency and developmental non-governmental 
organizations have also come to play an important part in 
peacebuilding activities.  This issue paper, commissioned by the non-
governmental organization Peacebuild, aims to provide a concise 
review of certain peacebuilding policies and practices. This will be 
done by looking at the ways in which a variety of international actors 
have conceived the concept of peacebuilding and how civil society, 
mostly a few international non-governmental organizations (INGOs) 
have contributed to its expansion.  
Readers ought to bear in mind that this draft issue paper was 
produced under a tight timeline (three weeks) and primarily for the 
purpose of stimulating discussion during a consultation in Ottawa on 
March 14, 2011. It does not pretend to present an exhaustive review 
of all approaches, debates and peacebuilding strategies. Neither does 
it pretend to defend a thesis or a particular argumentative line. We 
have sought to provide an overview of some peacebuilding strategies 
and main debates (how to include local ownership in specific peacebuilding strategies, how to 
promote integrative strategies between donor countries, how to increase interactions between 
international and local actors, etc.) and elicit a discussion with practitioners over what 
peacebuilding means for them. The main conclusions of the debate will be summarized in a 
workshop report.  
 
This background paper 
has been produced for a 
workshop on “Civil society 
views on next generation 
peacebuilding and conflict 
prevention policy and 
programming issues and 
responses”, convened by 
Peacebuild in Ottawa on 
March 14, 2011 with the 
support of the Department 
of Foreign Affairs and 
International Trade. 
The Peacebuilding and 
Conflict Prevention 
consultation series seeks 
to bring together expert 
civil society practitioners, 
academics and 
Government of Canada 
officials to generate up-to-
date information and 
analysis, as well as policy 
and programming options 
to respond to 
developments and 
emerging trends in 
peacebuilding. 
Other subjects in the 
series include: 
Women’s political 
participation in peace 
processes*Peacebuilding 
in Latin America* 
Translating the norms of 
Women, Peace and 
Security*Natural resource 
conflicts and conflict 
transformation* The 













Challenges from the rise of intra-state violence 
There is a wide consensus among political analysts and practitioners 
concerning the importance of the state collapse phenomenon in 
contemporary world politics. A number of important issues are 
considered under the rubric of state collapse, including international 
terrorism; transnational crime; ethnic conflict; and human security 
threats such as HIV/AIDS or ecological degradation. Indeed, in light 
of the growing number of intra-state conflicts, the central cause of 
war in the present international system stems from weak and failed 
states.
1
 According to the latest issue of the SIPRI Yearbook, state 
weakness is among the most critical factors stimulating armed 
violence.
2
 Close to a billion people are living in dysfunctional states 
according to Ashraf Ghani and Clare Lockhart, rendered powerless 
by a “sovereignty gap” – the disjunction between the de jure 
assumption that all states are sovereign regardless of their 
performance in practice.
3
 Except for some specific authors,
4
 
reconstruction of the state is believed to be necessary, as is external 
assistance for the collapsed state in a transitional period. William 
Zartman, states “it is necessary to provide a large, informally 
representative forum, and if the contenders for power do not do so, 
an external force to guarantee security and free expression during the 
legitimization process may be required… In all three areas – power, 
participation, and resources – it is hard to get around the usefulness, 
                                                        
1 See: Kalevi Holsti, The State, War, and the State of War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), xi. Mary Kaldor, New 
and Old Wars (Cambridge: Polity, 2001), 5. 
2 Ekaterina Stepanova, “Armed Conflict, Crime and Criminal Violence” in SIPRI Yearbook 2010: Armaments, Disarmament and 
International Security (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010).  
3 Ashraf Ghani and Clare Lockhart. Fixing Failed States: A Framework for Rebuilding a Fractured World (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2008), 21. 
4 See for instance the scholars defending the theory of the “fresh start.” Andreas Mehler and Claude Ribaux state that “the 
collapse of states in crisis need not be prevented, since a „better state‟ cannot emerge until that collapse has taken place.” For 
Samuel Eisenstadt, “collapse, far from being an anomaly, both in the real world and in social evolutionary theory, presents in 
dramatic form not the end of social institutions, but almost always the beginning of new ones.” Finally, Timothy Raeymaekers 
argues that “we should start thinking hard about the possibility that state collapse presents a plausible, and perhaps even likely, 
outcome for some states in the system.” Andreas Mehler and Claude Ribaux, Crisis Prevention and Conflict Management in 
Technical Cooperation: An Overview of the National and International Debate (Wiesbaden: Universum Verlangsanstalt / 
Deutsche Gesselschaft für Technische Zussamenarbeit, 2000), 107; Samuel Eisenstadt, “Beyond Collapse,” in The Collapse of 
Ancient States and Civilizations, ed. Norman Yoffee and George Cowgill (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1988), 243; 
Timothy Raeymaekers, “Collapse or Order? Questioning State Collapse in Africa?” Conflict Research Group, Working Paper no. 
1, May 2005, 7. See also: Martin Doornbos, “State Collapse and Fresh Starts: Some Critical Reflections,” in State Failure, 
Collapse and Reconstruction, ed. Jennifer Milliken, 45-62. Oxford: Blackwell, 2003; Nicholas van Hear, “Re-Casting Societies in 
Conflict,” Center on Migration, Policy and Society, Oxford University, Working Paper no. 22, 2005; and the proponents of the 
laissez-faire approach: Edward Luttwak, “Give War a Chance” Foreign Affairs 78, no. 4 (July-August 1999): 36-44; and Jeffrey 
Herbst, “Let Them Fail: State Failure in Theory and Practice” in When States Fail: Causes and Consequences, edited by Robert 
Rotberg (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004).  
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if not the outright need, of external assistance.”5 However, the exact nature of this external 
assistance is still widely debated. 
Peacebuilding: Between state collapse and state-building 
The general ambition of peacebuilding is “to identify and support structures that will tend to 
strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict.”6 It connotes activities that 
go beyond crisis intervention, such as longer-term development, and building of governance 
structures and institutions. In that regard, it is a concept integral to the more general concept of 
state-building (and state collapse). For Zartman, state collapse refers to “situations where the 
structure, authority (legitimate power), law, and political order have fallen apart and must be 
reconstituted in some form, old or new… As the authoritative political institution, (the collapsed 
state) has lost its legitimacy, which is therefore up for grabs, and so has lost its right to command 
and conduct public affairs.”7 More often than not, the state collapse process entails political 
violence and a mix of intra- and inter-state conflict. Hence, peacebuilding aims “to address the 
sources of current hostility and build local capacities for conflict resolution. Stronger state 
institutions, broader political participation, land reform, a deepening of civil society, and respect 
for ethnic identities are all seen as ways to improve the prospects for peaceful governance.”8 
However, peacebuilding has become a broadly used but often ill-defined term connoting 
activities that go beyond crisis intervention such as longer-term development, and building of 
governance structures and institutions, to the extent that Roland Paris states that nowadays “there 
is no universally accepted definition of peacebuilding” while Charles-Philippe David considers 
that there are “as many visions of peacebuilding as there are experts on the issue and actors on 
the field.”9  
The rise of the “integrated paradigm” 
The viability of the concept of peacebuilding resides in its integration of a strategic approach and 
the inclusive notion of peace attached to it. When peacebuilding is not seen as “transformative”, 
but simply as a stop-gap measure, there is a strong probability of seeing a relapse into conflict in 
the following years, following the scaling down of the international involvement. This is 
consistent with the data collected by Roy Licklider and Paul Collier among others, showing that 
about a quarter of all peace agreements fail in the first five years after they have been signed and 
                                                        
5 William Zartman, “Putting Things Back Together” in Collapsed States: The Disintegration and Restoration of Legitimate 
Authority, ed. William Zartman (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1995), 270-272. The three areas the author refers to are 1) 
reconstructing central power (the powerful must be recognized as legitimate, or the legitimate must be made powerful); 2) 
increasing state legitimacy through participation; and 3) raising and allocating economic resources in support of peace.  
6 United Nations, An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-keeping, UN. Doc. A/47/277 and 
S/24/111, 17 June 1992, para. 46. 
7 William Zartman, “Introduction: Posing the problem of state collapse” in Collapsed States: The Disintegration and Restoration 
of Legitimate Authority, ed. William Zartman (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1995), 1-5. 
8 Michael Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis, “International Peacebuilding: A Theoretical and Quantitative Analysis,” American 
Political Science Review 94, no 4 (December 2000), 779. 
9 Roland Paris, “Broadening the Study of Peace Operations,” International Studies Review 2, no. 3 (Fall 2000), 33 (footnote 18); 
Charles-Philippe David, “Does Peacebuilding Build Peace?” Security Dialogue 30, no. 1 (March 1999), 27. 




nearly 50 per cent fail within ten years. This led to the necessity to adopt integrated strategies for 
peacebuilding.
10
 In light of the increased complexity of post-conflict environments, which 
includes the growing awareness of the state collapse phenomenon in the 1990s, there have been 
significant calls to react to these exigencies with coherent multilateral responses. The 2004 
Utstein Study of peacebuilding analyzed more than 336 peacebuilding projects implemented by 
Germany, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and Norway over the previous decade and 
identified a lack of coherence at the strategic level, what the authors termed a “strategic deficit,” 
as the most significant obstacle to sustainable peacebuilding. The Utstein study found also that 
more than 55 per cent of the programmes it evaluated did not show any link to a larger country 
strategy.
11
 The integrated mission concept was designed to address this shortcoming. 
The United Nations’ “New Architecture of Peace” 
The United Nations began to tackle the theoretical issue of “rebuilding wartorn societies” in 
1992-1993, which coincides loosely with the collapse of both Somalia and the Socialist Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY). The United Nations Research Institute for Social Development 
(UNRISD) convened its first research-preparatory workshop on this theme in April 1993 and the 
United Nations Development Program (UNDP) developed a program on “Linking Rehabilitation 
to Development: Management Revitalization of Wartorn Societies” around the same time.12 The 
creation in 1992 of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) at the UN under the 
leadership of Boutros Boutros-Ghali also opened new perspectives for the development of 
peacebuilding operations. If the UN sometimes experimented with peace missions that entailed 
peacebuilding activities in the Congo (1960-1964), Cyprus (since 1964) and Lebanon (since 
1978), most peace missions during the Cold War involved traditional activities of supervision of 
ceasefire agreements or interposition between warring countries‟ forces. With the growing role 
played by the Security Council after 1988,
13
 no less than 14 new peace missions saw the light in a 
four-year period, compared to the 13 stood up between 1948 and 1988. Quickly enough, the UN 
found itself embroiled in complex environments without coherent strategies, which subsequently 
led to “crises of expectations” in the mid- to late-90s.14 The Report of the Panel on United 
Nations Peace Operations, otherwise known as the Brahimi Report, underlined the necessity to 
reinforce the peacebuilding structures inside the UN, while providing the institution with a clear 
doctrine. Without institutional changes, the UN will not be capable of “executing the critical 
                                                        
10 Roy Licklider, “The Consequences of Negotiated Settlements in Civil Wars, 1945-93,” American Political Science Review 89, 
No 3 (September 1995): 681-690; Paul Collier et al, Breaking the Conflict Trap: Civil Wars and Development Policy 
(Washington: World Bank & Oxford University Press, 2003). 
11 Dan Smith, “Towards a Strategic Framework for Peacebuilding: Getting Their Act Together,” overview report of the Joint 
Utstein Study of Peacebuilding, Evaluation Report 1/2004, Oslo: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2004, 10. The Utstein Project was 
established by the development ministers of the UK, the Netherlands, Norway and Germany in 1999, with the aim of improving 
the implementation of their peacebuilding strategies.  
12 Martin Doornbos, “State Formation and Collapse; Reflections on Identity and Power,” in Pivot Politics: Changing Cultural 
Identities in Early State Formation Processes, ed. Martin van Bakel, Renée Hagesteijn and Pieter van de Velde (Amsterdam: Het 
Spinhuis, 1994), note 1, 281. 
13 The reactivation of the Security Council predates the fall of the Berlin Wall and followed Mikhail Gorbachev‟s elaboration of a 
new international policy.  
14 Ramesh Thakur and Carlyle Thaker, A Crisis of Expectations: UN Peacekeeping in the 1990s (Boulder: Westview Press, 1995). 




peacekeeping and peace-building tasks that the Member States assign it in coming months and 
years.”15 
To meet these challenges, the UN also tried to promote integrative policies. The UN Report on 
Integrated Missions defines an integrated mission as “an instrument with which the UN seeks to 
help countries in the transition from war to lasting peace, or to address similarly complex 
situations that require a system-wide UN response, through subsuming different actors and 
approaches within an overall political-strategic crisis management framework.”16 In other words, 
an integrated mission requires the UN to develop an overarching strategic vision of each peace 
operation and to gather all the appropriate tools available across the UN system to achieve those 
goals.
17
 An integrated mission is defined as one in which there is a shared vision among all UN 
actors as to the strategic objective of the UN presence at country level.
18
 In his report on UN 
reform, In Larger Freedom, then Secretary-General Kofi Annan recognized that there was a 
“gaping hole” in the UN‟s institutional machinery in this area: “…No part of the United Nations 
system effectively addresses the challenge of helping countries with the transition from war to 
lasting peace.”19  
The UN Peacebuilding Commission was created in 2005 in order to tackle this issue, notably to 
“…advise on and propose integrated strategies for post-conflict peacebuilding and recovery [and] 
to focus attention on the reconstruction and institution-building efforts necessary for recovery 
from conflict and to support the development of integrated strategies in order to lay the 
foundation for sustainable development.”20 Thus, according to the new UN doctrine, the creation 
of the new “peacebuilding architecture”21 reflects “a growing recognition within the international 
community of the linkages between UN peacemaking, peacekeeping and peacebuilding roles. 
When a country comes before it, the Peacebuilding Commission helps marshal the resources at 
the disposal of the international community and advise and propose integrated strategies for 
peacebuilding and recovery.”22 In so doing, the Peacebuilding Commission can help gather the 
resources and provide comprehensive strategies to support countries which are not international 
hotspots. Since its birth, the Peacebuilding Commission has focused on the cases of Burundi, 
Central African Republic, Guinea-Bissau, Sierra Leone and, more recently, Liberia and Guinea. 
                                                        
15 United Nations, Report of the Panel on Peace Operations, UN Doc. A/55/305-S/2000/809, 21 August 2000, Section 1.  
16 Espen Barth Eide et al. “Report on Integrated Missions: Practical Perspectives and Recommendations,” Independent Study for 
the Expanded UN ECHA Core Group, May 2005, 3.  
17 Emily Munro, “Multidimensional and Integrated Peace Operations: Trends and Challenges,” GCSP Geneva Paper 1, May 2008, 
10. 
18 United Nations, Integrated Missions Planning Process (IMPP), 13 June 2006, 2. 
19 United Nations, In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human Rights for All, UN Doc A/59/2005, 21 March 
2005, para. 114. 
20 United Nations, The Peacebuilding Commission, UN Doc. A/RES/60/180 and S/RES/1645, 30 December 2005, para 2(a). 
21 This architecture comprises the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC), a 31-Member State subsidiary advisory body of both the 
General Assembly and the Security Council; the Peacebuilding Fund (PBF), a multi-year standing trust fund for post-conflict 
peacebuilding and; the Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO), which is the part of the Secretariat that services the PBC, manages 
the PBF, and supports UN system peacebuilding efforts. 
22 United Nations, United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines, 20. 




A 2008 report by the Center on International Cooperation at New York University and the 
International Peace Institute flagged a number of shortfalls, notably inadequate coordination with 
international financial institutions and other UN agencies and departments (among them the 
Security Council), while noting a modest number of positive results achieved by the 
Commission.
23
 The review of the UN peacebuilding architecture adopted a critical tone, hoping 
that the report would serve as a “wake-up call” to the international community, “helping to 
strengthen the collective resolve to deal with peacebuilding in a more comprehensive and 
determined way.”24  
DFID: Fragile or poor states? 
For the United Kingdom‟s Department for International Development (DFID), fragile states 
“have governments that cannot or will not deliver its basic functions to the majority of its people, 
including the poor.”25 Using the World Bank‟s Country Policy and Institutional Assessments as a 
way to estimate the level of fragility, DFID divides low-income countries into five categories of 
performance, the lowest two of which are “useful proxies for state fragility.” There is a separate 
group of unranked countries, also deemed fragile. This provides a list of 46 fragile states, 
containing 870 million people or 14 per cent of the world‟s population. Middle-income countries 
are not included in this list.
26
 This analysis is reinforced by a number of scholarly contributions. 
According to Maria Ottaway and Stefan Mair, “there is hardly a low-income country that does 
not face the possibility of failure,”27 while for Stuart Eizenstat, John Porter and Jeremy 
Weinstein, “of the world‟s more than 70 low-income nations, about 50 of them are weak in a way 
that threatens US and international security.”28  
This analysis brings to light a number of practical issues. In this context, the expression “failed or 
failing state” seems to be a convenient neologism describing nothing more than a state with low-
standards of living, a country that has not attained the same level of development – measured as 
the public goods provision of state institutions – as the “developed world”. As Aradhana Sharma 
and Akhil Gupta state,  
“…Many comparative and classificatory analyses of states, such as those that rank 
states as „weak‟ or „strong,‟ effectively strip the unit of analysis – the state – from 
its cultural moorings… Such exercises take for granted that „fully developed‟ and 
„ideal‟ states are Western liberal democratic ones. Western states are thus often 
                                                        
23 NYU Center on International Cooperation and International Peace Institute, Taking Stock, Looking Forward: A Strategic 
Review of the Peacebuilding Commission, April 2008.  
24 United Nations, Review of the United Nations Peacebuilding Architecture, UN Doc. A/64/868 and S/2010/393, 21 July 2010.  
25 DFID, “Fragile States,” http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http://www.dfid.gov.uk/fightingpoverty/fragile_states.asp 
(last accessed 18 February 2011).  
26 DFID, Why We Need to Work More Effectively in Fragile States (London: Department for International Development, January 
2005), 7. 
27 Maria Ottaway and Stefan Mair, States at Risk and Failed States: Putting Security First. New York: Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace, 2004, 2. 
28 Stuart Eizenstat, John Porter and Jeremy Weinstein, “Rebuilding Weak States,” Foreign Affairs 84, no. 1 (January-February 
2005), 136. 




employed as the norm against which other states are judged; the criteria for 
„strong‟ state are almost always those that apply to a specific subset of Western 
nation-states.”29 
Hence, while attempting to forecast state failure (see annex for various indicators of state failure 
or fragility), the poverty-focused approach adopted by some of the DFID reports leaves aside 
potential political crises arising in middle-income countries. The recent turmoil in the Middle 
East is a good example at hand. At the same time, it can leave the impression of specifically 
targeting certain regions of the world for their poor distribution of public goods, while not taking 
into account alternatives to centralized state institutions. For instance, the United Nations 
Development Program (UNDP) has noted that 80 per cent of worldwide justice development 
assistance goes to the formal justice sector, while traditional and customary systems resolve 
around 90 per cent of conflicts.
30
  
OECD: Bringing legitimacy into the picture 
The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) indicates that “states are 
fragile when state structures lack political will and/or capacity to provide the basic functions 
needed for poverty reduction, development and to safeguard the security and human rights of 
their populations.”31 However, the OECD, maybe more than any other international organization, 
incorporates legitimacy aspects in its analysis. In one of its reports, it states that “in practical and 
political terms, international actors have tended to focus either on capacity or will, perhaps 
reflecting the instruments available to them. Relatively few incorporate questions of legitimacy in 
any operational sense. Each of these, however – capacity, will, legitimacy – is critical to a more 
accurate and dynamic understanding of fragility and its causes.”32 As the report notes, the goal is 
to shift thinking “from a focus on transferring institutional models, towards a focus on the local 
political processes, which create public institutions and generate their legitimacy in the eyes of a 
state‟s population.”33 
As identified by the authors of the report, the implications for policy-making are numerous. First, 
the need for proper country assessments that take note of informal and non-state service provision 
as well as those of the state. Integrated or joint assessments should be prioritized, in order to 
avoid counter-productive strategies between countries. Second, when a legitimate settlement is 
emerging, forge joint, multi-donor strategy with the government, and then provide direct support 
to the state budget without undue interference as to the prioritization or allocation of that support. 
                                                        
29 Aradhana Sharma and Akhil Gupta, “Introduction: Rethinking Theories of the State in an Age of Globalization,” in The 
Anthropology of the State: A Reader, ed. Aradhana Sharma and Akhil Gupta (Oxford: Blackwell, 2006), 10-11. 
30 UNDP, “Access to Justice,” Practice Note, 9 March 2004, 8-9. 
31 OECD, Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States and Situations, April 2007, para. 3. See also: OECD, 
Service Delivery in Fragile Situations: Key Concepts, Findings and Lessons, OECD/DAC Discussion Paper, 2008, 7.   
32 OECD, Concepts and Dilemmas of State Building in Fragile Situations: From Fragility to Resilience, OECD/DAC Discussion 
Paper, 2008, 16. 
33 OECD, Concepts and Dilemmas of State Building in Fragile Situations: From Fragility to Resilience, OECD/DAC Discussion 
Paper, 2008, 3. 




This is a huge point of contention, since many states are blocked from doing so by legislation 
while most donors don‟t trust the capacity of governments to manage the funds and want credit 
for their projects. Nevertheless, it is a debate that should be addressed according to the authors. 
Following certain conditions (establishment of reinforcement of sound management systems, 
clear sequencing, so on), Ghani and Lockhart favour national programs over other types of 
implementation (humanitarian programs, quick-impact projects, development projects or sector 
approaches).
34
 Where the state lacks the basic will to negotiate a resilient social contract, there 
should be political engagement with the government to seek to generate the necessary political 
reforms and support to service delivery functions of the state, if viable, or alternative mechanisms 
of service delivery to meet human needs where not. Third, policy on semi-authoritarian states 
should identify opportunities for engagement with state institutions where that engagement may 
have only minimal impact on state legitimacy. Peacebuilding or statebuilding should seek to 
avoid extending regime survival, while at the same time reducing the likelihood of a rapid 
political transition that could trigger chaotic state collapse. 
Norway: Sustainability and local ownership in peacebuilding 
In 2004, Norway released it strategic framework on peacebuilding, which laid out three main 
goals: security, economic and social development, and political development. From 2004 on, 
Norway has recognized peacebuilding as one of the main priorities for the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs (MFA). Multilateral peacebuilding approaches are favoured by Norway. Its 2008-2009 
white paper states, “In fragile states, Norway  mainly works through and in close cooperation 
with the UN system, the World Bank and NATO, and with regional organisations such as the 
African Union (AU) and the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)”.35 
Norway considers that the use of multilateral channels or civil society is a way to help vulnerable 
groups when government-to-government assistance as an instrument of peacebuilding is difficult 
to opt for due to poor governance, weak institutions and policies.
36
 
The notions of sustainability through a common multilateral approach and the principle of local 
ownership that are promoted by Norway, raise a question.
37
 To what extent does the use of a 
multilateral approach risks creating parallel structures that will further undermine ownership?  
The lack of common understanding of what the UN peacebuilding architecture entails and how it 
should be used has been, until now, a major factor contributing to the incoherence and relatively 
poor record of sustainability of peacebuilding efforts by donor countries.
38
 Although supporting 
sustainability of effort was one of the main objectives of the peacebuilding architecture when the 
mechanisms were established at its origin, the 2009 UN Secretary General‟s report on 
                                                        
34 Ghani and Lockhart, 198. 
35 Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Norwegian development policy adapting to change, Report No. 13 (2008-2009) to the 
Stoting, Climate, Conflict and Capital, 2008-2009, 63. 
36 Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Strategic Framework, Peacebuilding – a Development Perspective, 2004, 35.  
37 Ibid.1p. 5. 
38 Cedric de Coning, Clarity, Coherence and Context : Three Priorities for sustainable Peacebuilding, Working Paper : The future 
of the Peacebuilding Architecture Project, CIPS-NUPI, 2010, 14. 




peacebuilding in the aftermath of conflict has, according to Erin McCandless, submerged the 
principle of sustainability. By refocusing priorities within the two first years following a conflict, 
the peacebuilding architecture will be less able to support efforts to ensure medium- to long-term 
sustainability.
39
    
The World Bank’s State and Peace-Building Fund 
The World Bank has identified fragile states and conflict-affected countries as one of its six 
strategic themes for achieving inclusive and sustainable globalization. In April 2008, the bank 
created a trust fund, the State and Peace-Building Fund (SPF), to catalyze its work. The new fund 
replaced the Post-Conflict Fund (PCF) and the Low Income Countries Under Stress Trust Fund 
(LICUS TF) which have been operational since 1998 and 2004, respectively. The two main goals 
of the fund are to support measures to improve governance and institutional performance and 
support the reconstruction and development of countries prone to, in, or emerging from conflict. 
The Board of Directors committed to the provision of US$100 million from the bank‟s own 
administrative budget for the period 2009-2011, and the fund received contributions from the 
governments of the Netherlands and Norway.  
This development follows the increasing role played by Multi-Donor Trust Funds (MDTFs) in 
post-conflict environments. The PCF can be used to support a wider range of partners, including 
national governments, UN agencies, international NGOs, transitional authorities and local civil 
society. It is generally used to support early recovery activities. The MDTFs are more traditional 
instruments for improving resource efficiency and effectiveness by reducing transaction costs, 
and, in particular, by mitigating high risks inherent in post-crisis environments. The UN or the 
World Bank is best suited to administer such funds due to their ability and capacity to work in 
such high-risk environments. UN administered MDTFs have typically more rapid disbursement 
arrangements and more flexible procedures, while World Bank administered MDTFs are more 
effective at using developing country systems and supporting long-term development 
initiatives.
40
 It may be desirable to sequence a UN and a World Bank MDTF. A UN MDTF could 
be used for quick impact projects, to, in part, demonstrate a peace dividend. The World Bank 




An African policy framework  
The African Union (AU) has been increasingly involved in peacebuilding in the past few years. 
In collaboration with the Regional Economic Communities (RECS), it has developed a Peace and 
Security Architecture (AUA), much like the UN Peacebuilding Architecture (PBA), to prevent, 
manage and resolve conflicts in Africa. A key feature of the AU‟s engagement in peacebuilding 
is its Post-Conflict Reconstruction Policy Framework which rests on five key principles: African 
                                                        
39
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leadership; national and local ownership; inclusiveness; equity and non-discrimination; 
cooperation and coherence; and capacity building for sustainability.
42
 
While being concerned with local ownership, the AU is itself partly a subject of local ownership 
from an international standpoint. Local ownership can be understood as a process where the 
solutions to a particular society‟s needs are developed in concert with the people who are going 
to live with, and uphold, these solutions in the long run.
43
 African solutions to African problems 
is one of the core principles of the AU peace and security architecture. However, this architecture 
is also fraught with difficulties (lack of resources, weak structures, etc.) and challenges among its 
member states.  
 
At the international level there is recognition that the role sub-regional organizations play in 
maintaining peace and security is desirable, feasible and necessary.
 44
 However, despite the UN 
vision of a mutually-reinforcing global-regional mechanism
45
 for peace and security, challenges 
remain to transform words into actions. Improvised, politically-selective and resource-skewed 
approaches to regionalism are impediments to the global-regional approach.
46
 
The AU has developed a peace and security architecture, but questions remain. Will the AU be 
able to carry out its intended goals? And how will it be able to operationalize its work? How will 
it partner with the UN and other actors from civil society to increase coordination and 
effectiveness? 
 
Civil society as a key peacebuilding actor 
There is wide consensus regarding the centrality of civil society to conflict resolution. The 
primacy given to the construction of civil society as a keystone for building peace was laid out in 
the Agenda for Peace. Commonly, civil society refers to a diversity of spaces, actors and 
institutional forms, varying in their degree of formality, autonomy and power.
47
. From this 
definition, it is understood that in a broad conceptual sense, civil society goes beyond NGOs and 
formally constituted organizations.  
Since the 1990s, international non-governmental organizations have taken on more and more 
leadership responsibilities in peacebuilding efforts.  
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The contributions of INGOs to peacebuilding activities have come to complement those of donor 
states, international and regional organizations and, therefore, become essential to conflict 
responses and in strengthening peacebuilding processes. This is evident in the growing 
engagement of INGOs with state actors, notably through bilateral governmental aid being 
channelled through them. INGOs have also been seen as essential partners of the UN in 
mobilizing public opinion, in the process of deliberation, policy formulation and in the execution 
of policies.
48
 Coordination and cooperation among INGOs and with other peacebuilding players 
has been a challenge due to scarcity of resources, lack of time, divergent ideologies, etc.   
In international relations, INGOs are viewed as vehicles of democratization and of local civil 
society capacity-building
49
. On the ground, they often aim to empower and increase the capacity 
of local civil society actors, often through providing indispensable services and/or opportunities 
no longer provided by a weak or failed state. They are also involved, to a lesser degree, with 
heightening individual and collective capacities of state‟s institutions. Because of their relative 
independence, legitimacy and the broad scope of their work, they have been able to create 
relationships of trust with local civil society (local NGOs, elites, youth, women‟s groups, etc.) 
and often been central to communicating local concerns in national and international forums.  
However, some INGOs have been criticized by local civil society for following the agendas of 
their home country, especially in the peacebuilding sphere, rather than maintaining impartial 
status.
50
 INGOs have also been seen as promoting the principles of liberal peace and have come 
to be equated by some publics and donors with civil society in the South, thus reducing the space 
and the possibilities for indigenous peacebuilding organizations and networks to flourish.
51
   
UN Police as early peacebuilders  
In post-conflict situations, the rule of law, security and justice infrastructures have been destroyed 
or gravely compromised. Rebuilding these institutions has become an important part of most UN 
peacekeeping and peacebuilding mandates. For example, the Peacebuilding Commission has 
prioritized, in a mutual commitment with the Government of Liberia, security sector reform and 
the rule of law.
52
 This focus will be critical in the transfer of security management from the 
United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) to the Government of Liberia.   
 
UN Police (UNPOL), through the expertise acquired in their home countries, address specific 
needs as well as help build and develop basic police functions. The concept of United Nations 
civilian police was first introduced in the Congo mission in 1960-1964, arguably the first 
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multidimensional and integrated peace mission. However, it only became a significant element of 
peace missions at the end of the 1980s.
53
 UNPOL mandates at that time were summarized by the 




Contributing countries are responsible for the proper selection and training of UNPOL officers 
prior to deployment. Once in mission, officers normally receive two-weeks of training tailored to 
the mission in which they will be operating. However, police contributing countries do not 
always have the necessary resources and capacity to carefully select or provide adequate training 
prior to deployment.  
INGOs such as the Pearson Peacekeeping Center (PPC), work in partnership with many African 
and Latin American countries to build their institutional capacity to select, deploy and train 
UNPOL officers that will in turn serve to reform and professionalize the local police. One of the 
PPC flagship areas of expertise is to improve the capacity of female UNPOL officers to provide 
assistance to victims of gender-based violence and help the local police better investigate gender-
based crimes of violence. The PPC has also worked with the UN Department of Peacekeeping 
Operations (DPKO) to support their campaign to increase the number of female UNPOL officers 
to 20 per cent by 2014 and thus fulfill the goals of United Nations Security Council Resolutions 
1325 and 1820.  
Communications and peacebuilding  
Having access to information and improving communication in post-conflict settings are vital for 
building a culture of peace. A culture of peace refers to a set of “values, attitudes, and behaviours 
that reflect and inspire social interaction and sharing on basic principles,” that foster social justice 
and non-violence.
55
 Community and social media, and particularly radio, have the power to play 
a crucial role in peacebuilding contexts in fostering a culture of peace. Community media centres 
have helped assist local populations to harness the power of media to counteract divisions, quell 
rumours, give a voice to the voiceless, encourage people to think of peaceful solutions and to deal 
with problems in a creative and non-violent fashion.  
A range of INGOs have been involved in this type of programming, notably through delivering 
journalism training (Journalists for Human Rights), radio networks (World Association of 
Community Radio Broadcasters), community outreach programs that builds local capacity 
(International Women‟s Tribune Center), among others. INGOs have also used blogs, wikis and 
other forms of social and alternative media to communicate information about conflict issues and 
to hear voices rarely heard in the mainstreamed media.  
In partnership with women‟s groups in Uganda, Liberia, Kenya, and elsewhere, the International 
Women‟s Tribune Center (IWTC) has produced a series of radio programs called Women Talk 
Peace that aim to raise awareness about United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325, which 
                                                        
53 Annika Hansen, From Congo to Kosovo: Civilian Police in Peace Operations (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002). 
54 The SMART concept was first introduced in a DPKO booklet entitled “A Trainers Guide on Human Rights for CIVPOL 
Monitors,” according to police expert Robert Perito from the United States Institute for Peace. 
55
 General Assembly, Culture of Peace, A/RES/52/13, 15 January 1998.  




specifically addresses the impact of war on women and women's contributions to conflict 
resolution and sustainable peace. Through the production of these radio programs that are 
developed hand in hand with women‟s groups, IWCT aims at empowering women, at enabling 
their ability to redefine development paradigms, at fostering women's participation in the public 
policy arena and building democratic societies. 
Along with citizen journalists, Ushahidi was developed to map reports of violence in Kenya 
following the election in 2008. Ushahidi, “testimony” in Swahili, was created as a way to 
challenge the traditional ways that information flows. Thanks to citizen journalists in times of 
crisis (Kenya and Haiti), incidents of violence and peace efforts have been mapped on an Internet 
platform. These maps were based on reports submitted via web and mobile phones. INGOs and 
UN peacekeepers are known to have used Ushahidi mapping in Haiti to locate and assist people 
in distress.  
Such initiatives build on the crucial role civil society plays in communications for peacebuilding 
efforts.   
Women as peacebuilders 
Involving women and taking a gender perspective on peacebuilding activities have been 
recognized as essential for democratic inclusiveness, sustained economic growth and human and 
social capital recovery.
56
 In fact, some researchers and practitioners believe that peacebuilding 
“may well offer the single greatest opportunity to redress gender inequities and injustices of the 
past while, setting new precedents for the future”57.  
 
In 2009, when the Security Council adopted UN SCR 1889, it asked the Secretary General to 
produce a report on women‟s participation in peacebuilding.  The report highlighted that women 
are crucial partners in shoring up the three pillars of lasting peace: economic recovery, social 
cohesion and political legitimacy.
58
 The report also highlighted some of the challenges to 
women‟s participation in public and political life, such as lack of economic opportunities, gender 
stereotypes, threats to their physical safety, lower educational attainment and the lack of time on 
their hands because of unequal division of domestic responsibilities. However, it has also been 
recognized that women‟s opportunities can be enhanced or constrained by the international 
community in ways in which it establishes its priorities and uses its resources for peacebuilding. 
Channelling money into women‟s and gender issues in post-conflict countries is crucial.  This 
was emphasized by Michelle Bachelet in a recent speech as one of the three most important 
priorities of UN Women.
59
 In 2010, UNIFEM conducted a review of gender equality funding 
gap. The study found that in six post-conflict countries only 5.7 per cent of funding was directed 
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Projects that aim at developing the capacity of local women peacemakers or networks of men 
dedicated to developing healthy masculinities and/or combatting sexual and gender-based 
violence can be an effective means of ensuring that women and men participate in and benefit 
from post-conflict programming.
61
 The Global Network of Women‟s Peacebuilders (GNWP) is a 
good example of an organization that has prioritized the work of women in peacebuilding.  
GNWP aims at bridging the gap between policy discussions (Security Council), implementation 
(governments) and action (women‟s groups) on the ground with regards to women, peace and 
security issues. They have particularly been successful in connecting grassroots peacebuilders to 
national and international actors, particularly the friends of the women, peace and security agenda 
chaired by the Permanent Mission of Canada to the United Nations and developing the capacity 




Since Boutros-Ghali announced his Agenda for Peace in 1992, the concept of peacebuilding has 
been broadly used, revealed its complexity and demonstrated its worth in contributing to short-
term humanitarian goals and long-term development goals. Moreover, in the past years, a greater 
number of actors at the international, regional and local level have been engaged and involved in 
a variety of peacebuilding efforts. The complexities of tasks at hand, the varying approaches and 
the numerous actors involved in the process have shown the importance of and the challenges 
associated with coherence and collaboration among actors. The Peacebuilding Commission 
which was under review in the summer of 2010, may help in addressing present challenges and in 
generating a larger consensus on peacebuilding. The increasing recognition that the successes of 
peacebuilding efforts require local ownership is a key issue. External actors  -- international 
organizations, donors and NGOs -- can, after all, only facilitate and support peacebuilding.  
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Afghanistan X X X X X X 
Angola X  X X X X 
Azerbaïjan      X 
Bengladesh    X   
Burma X  X X X X 
Burundi X  X X X X 
Cambodia X     X 
Cameroon      X 
Central 
African Rep. 
X   X X X 
Chad   X X X X 
Colombia  X     
Comoros X     X 
Congo Dem 
Rep. 
X X X X X X 
Congo, Rep. 
of 
X  X X X X 
Ivory Coast X X X X X X 
Djibouti      X 
Dominica 
Rep. 
     X 
Equatorial 
Guinea 
    X  
Eritrea X    X X 
Ethiopia   X X X X 
Gambia      X 
Georgia      X 
Guinea X  X X X X 
Guinea 
Bissau 
X  X  X X 
Guyana      X 
Haiti X X  X X X 
Indonesia      X 
Iraq  X X X X  
Kenya    X  X 
Kiribati      X 




Kosovo X X     
Laos X     X 
Lebanon  X  X   
Liberia X X X X X X 
Malawi    X   
Mali      X 
Nepal  X X X X X 
Niger   X X X X 
Nigeria X  X X X X 
North Korea    X X  
Pakistan    X   
Papua New 
Guinea 
     X 
Rwanda   X  X  
Sao Tome & 
Principe 
     X 
Sierra Leone  X X X X X 
Solomon 
Islands 
X   X  X 
Somalia X X X X X X 
Sri Lanka    X   
Sudan X X X X X X 
Tajikistan      X 
Timor Leste X   X  X 
Togo X    X X 
Tonga      X 
Uganda   X X X  
Uzbekistan    X  X 
Vanuatu X     X 
West Band 
and Gaza 
X      
Yemen    X  X 
Zambia   X    
Zimbabwe X  X X X X 
Table adapted from Liana Wyler, Weak and Failing States: Evolving Security Threats and US Policy, 
Congressional Research Service Report for the US Congress, August 28 2008.  
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